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Book Review
BETWEEN CONSENTING PEOPLES: POLITICAL COMMUNITY
AND THE MEANING OF CONSENT, edited by Jeremy Webber
and Colin M. Macleod1
DWIGHT NEWMAN 2
IN LATE 2010, THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA split in the Aboriginal rights
decision Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation.' Justice Deschamps
wrote a separate concurring judgment partly to emphasize what she conceptual-
ized as the importance of an Aboriginal community not being permitted to "renege
unilaterally on its constitutional undertaking..." by claiming rights beyond those
in its treaty relationship.4 The decision capped a year that had included another
divisive foray5 by the Court into principles of Aboriginal treaty interpretation
in the context of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement' as well as the
Court's ongoing push for reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
communities-a goal pursued by the Court in its interpretation of section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982.
7
In the context of such pronouncements in the Court's jurisprudence, the col-
lection edited by Jeremy Webber and Colin Macleod, Between Consenting Peoples:
1. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 269 pages.
2. Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
3. [2010] 3 SCR 103 [Beckman].
4. Ibid at para 107.
5. Quebec (AG) v Moses, [2010] 1 SCR 557.
6. James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975), online:
<http://www.gcc.ca/pdf/LEG00000006.pdf> UBNQA].
7. Being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. For the Court's encouragement
of such reconciliation, see e.g. Beckman, supra note 3 at para 10 (explaining that "the recon-
ciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadian in a mutually respectful long-term
relationship is the grand purpose of s. 35"); Rio Tinto Alcan v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council,
[2010] 2 SCR 650 at para 38.
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Political Community and the Meaning of Consent, is a welcome contribution to the
discussion of a set of theoretical questions associated with consent in the context
of relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. The
collection emerges from a 2004 workshop held by the University of Victoria's
Consortium on Democratic Constitutionalism, but it remains a timely contribution
to an issue in political theory that has very current practical implications.
Webber opens the book with an essay exploring several different concepts of
consent from the viewpoint of various Western political theories, drawing from,
for instance, versions of hypothetical, liberal, group-based, and more implicit forms
of consent.8 Webber insightfully showcases serious questions arising from some of
these forms of consent. Notable are the sophisticated challenges he raises to the idea
of group-based consent, which pose questions regarding which collectivities can
consent to what and regarding who are the rightful representatives or members
of particular communities.9
Some of these theoretical concerns have been realized as practical problems
in Aboriginal rights cases. One example occurs in the context of identifying the
community that holds a collective Aboriginal right, which in turn affects the
determination of the group(s) to which government actors owe a duty to consult
in particular circumstances.1" These sorts of issues have led some political theo-
rists-in a move they seem to consider very progressive-to effectively abandon
the idea of Indigenous peoples having claims as groups due to the constructed
nature of some of their group identities.11 Webber rightly resists these impulses
and at least supposes that it might be possible to develop principled answers to
some of the questions. But to develop answers on even these questions of con-
sent would take a sustained argument of some length, 2 and they represent just a
subset of a longer list of questions about consent and political theory. As just the
introductory essay of this collection is written solely with his own pen, Webber
can hope only to open a conversation. The reader begins the book with hopes that
8. Jeremy Webber, "The Meanings of Consent" in Webber & Macleod, supra note 1, 3.
9. Ibidat 15-16.
10. Dwight Newman & Danielle Schweitzer, "Between Reconciliation and the Rule(s) of Law:
Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia" (2008) 41 UBC L Rev 249.
11. Such is, to a degree, the tack of Courtney Jung. See Courtney Jung, The Moral Force of
Indigenous Politics: Critical Liberalism and the Zapatistas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2008) at 282 (arguing that only Kymlicka-style group-differentiated rights
may be possible because of the fundamentally constructed nature of groups).
12. Having engaged elsewhere in an argument on collective rights at some length, I claim to have
tackled only some of them. See Dwight Newman, Community and Collective Rights: A
Theoretical Framework for Rights Held by Groups (Oxford: Hart, 2011).
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the impressive set of authors whose works are featured in the collection will take up
the challenge and engage with each other to arrive at some answers and defensible claims.
Part I of the book turns explicitly to the possibility of conceptions of consent
arising from Indigenous traditions. In the second essay, Val Napoleon examines the
Gitksan resolution of a 1945 intra-clan dispute and very briefly compares some
elements of the legal approach present in that dispute to features of legal reasoning
identified by Gerald Postema in the early English common law. Napoleon uses this
specific example to highlight the richness of reasoning within Indigenous legal
traditions and to call attention to the promise these traditions hold with regard to
the interaction of Indigenous peoples and Western legal systems. 3
Next, Janna Promislow analyzes historical encounters between Hudson's Bay
Company employees and primarily Cree traders at York Factory from 1682 to 1763.
She uses the pursuit of consensual relations in these interactions to argue for the role
of Indigenous agency. Promislow also notes the failure to achieve non-coerced meet-
ings of the minds in forming treaties, and she argues consequently for attention to
injustices that may have been embedded in allegedly consensual treaty norms. 14
The fourth piece is a contribution by Tim Rowse, subtitled "Some Australian
Stories," and is composed of several vignettes from Australian history. These
stories provide the foundation for arguments grounded in the work of Michel
Foucault and James Tully that conclude with words reflecting simple uncertainty
about the meaning of consent.15 The cumulative result is that part I of the book
opens the scope of material affecting readers' thinking, though it offers only a
limited set of claims.
Part II of the book includes rich pieces by leading theorists Margaret Moore,
David Dyzenhaus, and Duncan Ivison as well as a thoughtful piece by the up-and-
coming Andrde Boisselle. Unfortunately, none engages explicidy with any of the
others. However, a careful reading reveals some interrelations. In her essay,16
Moore poses important challenges to standard theories that posit that political le-
gitimation is attained through consent. She then develops a strong argument that
unjust usurpation of pre-existing governance structures violates some principles
that would be secure as requirements for legitimacy and that would thereby lead
13. Val Napoleon, "Living Together: Gitksan Legal Reasoning as a Foundation for Consent" in
Webber & Macleod, supra note 1, 45.
14. Janna Promislow, ""Thou Wilt Not Die of Hunger ... for I Bring Thee Merchandise': Consent,
Intersocietal Normativity, and the Exchange of Food at York Factory 1682-1763" in ibid, 77.
15. Tim Rowse, "The Complexity of the Object of Consent: Some Australian Stories" in Webber
& Macleod, supra note 1, 115.
16. Margaret Moore, "Indigenous Peoples and Political Legitimacy"' in Webber & Macleod, supra
note 1, 143.
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to modern obligations to redeem the relations with Indigenous peoples. While
challenging Jeremy Waldrons claim that the restitution of past harms to Indigenous
communities may have been wholly superseded by changed circumstances, 7
Moore recognizes that subsequent historical developments will both complicate
and limit any attempt to restore the past.18 However, she argues that forward-
looking redemptive action can nonetheless follow, thereby making constitutional
enforcement of minority rights an important part of forward-looking legitimacy
and essential in light of the state's inability to claim authority through a clear
record of providing justice when it has failed to do so. 9
It is here that one can link Moore's argument to Dyzenhaus's. Like Moore,
Dyzenhaus's piece explicitly discusses political legitimation. Dyzenhaus, follow-
ing a sophisticated comparison of the accounts of authority in Joseph Raz and
Thomas Hobbes, argues that the establishment of the rule of law has self-legit-
imating consequences and that a claim to just authority arises from the state's
non-arbitrary establishment of legal order.20 The absence of direct dialogue be-
tween Moore and Dyzenhaus here is unfortunate in light of the question that
logically arises as to whether the requirements each author develops for legiti-
macy are substitutive or complementary.
On this point, I see constitutional protections for certain minority rights as
partly helping to ensure the rule of law, thereby linking the two authors' argu-
ments. However, in the next essay of the book, Ivison offers a more rights-skeptical
argument, raising as a concern the "uneven" empowerment that arises from rights
as conceived within the normative systems that have included them. 1 Ivison
conceives of rights "naturalistically"-that is, as social practices emerging from
empirical forces-and as historically embedded, not only accruing to agents but
actually constituting them.22 Although he has expounded more on rights within
such a framework in his other writings, 23 the effect in the present context is to
17. Ibid at 162. Moore cites the first iteration of Waldrons argument. See Jeremy Waldron,
"Superseding Historic Injustice" (1992) 103 Ethics 4. Waldron has subsequently reiterated it
in other works, including specifically in regard to the Canadian context. See Jeremy Waldron,
"Redressing Historic Injustice" (2002) 52 UTLJ 135. Typically, theorists do not endeavour to
provide any answer. In my current research I am developing a fuller answer to this issue.
18. Moore, supra note 16 at 152.
19. Ibid at 153-58.
20. David Dyzenhaus, "Consent, Legitimacy, and the Foundation of Political and Legal Authority"
in Webber & Macleod, supra note 1,163 at 184.
21. Duncan Ivison, "Consent or Contestation?" in ibid, 188 at 197.
22. Ibid at 198-202.
23. See especially Duncan Ivison, PostcolonialLiberalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2002).
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undermine the role of rights as any sort of lead normative concept, putting in
question the claims that would have emerged from the Moore-Dyzenhaus line of
argument in prior essays.
Although Boisselle does not explicitly engage with Ivison in her piece, she
carries forward Ivison's problematization of the relationship between rights and
agents. She does so with her critique of Jeremy Waldron's procedural account of
the authority of the law (and particularly legislation) and its presumed binaries of
consent and disagreement. Boisselle uses this argument as a background to seeing
legality, agency, and culture as more deeply intertwined with one another than
in Waldron's account." Boisselle might have gone on to unpack these intercon-
nections in a variety of ways-and her future work will be something to watch
closely-but she is, of course, presently limited to the length of an essay.
James Tully's concluding essay,25 which occupies its own part of the book,
implicitly draws on part I insofar as he refers to some of the rich complexities
of treaty-making. However, particularly in light of the reader's high expectations
for the work of such a notable theorist, Tully ultimately seems to lose the subtler
thought of part II in discussions of relatively undifferentiated notions of hegemony,
which Tully considers to be a central concern. This concern seems to override any
reason to engage in the more precise distinctions to which part II began to lead.
Were there to have been some fuller engagement between the Moore-Dyzenhaus
line and the Ivison-Boisselle line-either in the collection itself or even in the
conclusion-the collection would perhaps have had the potential to make a deep
and lasting contribution to the project of understanding some of the implications
of the consent required for political action in relation to Aboriginal communities.
But the nature of an edited collection rather than a monograph is that the dif-
ferent authors can leave their pieces as brief arguments on smaller points and so
may not contribute as much as they could have. The editors of this collection have
brought together a set of top-notch thinkers who could have done more. It is
unfortunate that, while trapped in the limits of the edited collection form, they
do not engage in more dialogue to draw on its possible advantages.
There are various possible aspirations for political theory and its ability to
offer normative prescriptions for relationships between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous communities. If I were to express reservations that the collection's
theorists had not developed a set of universal normative principles, I would hasten
24. Andr~e BoisseUe, "Beyond Consent and Disagreement: Why Law's Authority Is Not Just about
Will" in Webber & Macleod, supra note 1, 207.
25. James Tully, "Consent, Hegemony, and Dissent in Treaty Negotiations" in Webber & Macleod,
supra note 1, 233.
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to add that doing so is not the only task of theorists. But it is a possible one. In
the context of claims established on consent, it is a task that could contribute in
a very meaningful way to the courts' engagement with issues like historical and
modern treaty interpretation or, more generally, the concept of reconciliation. It
is, unfortunately, not one with which this collection fully grapples.
That said, the collection remains an important contribution. It should be
read widely because it considers some of the most challenging questions of moral
and political theory faced by Canada and other states engaged with similar issues
of Indigenous rights. The collection's discussion is rich with possibilities and ideas
that will serve as groundwork for further theoretically sophisticated discussions
about consent, political theory, and the relationships between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous communities. It is to be profoundly hoped that these or other
authors take the discussion farther in the future.
